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This paper highlights the role of hatred and its evolution in determining the course of 
conflicts between nations following their signing of an agreement for truce. It 
analytically demonstrates that weak inertia, diminishing memory of hatred and a low 
propensity to reciprocate aversion are essential for reaching a genuine and stable 
peace. These propositions are employed to assess the prospects of genuine and stable 
peace between Israel and Palestine. It is argued that due to inertia, strong memory of 
collective hatred and high propensity to reciprocate collective aversion, the inherent 
course of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict does not lead to a genuine and stable peace. 
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Trucefully Yours: 
 






While the literature on conflicts between nations focuses on political and 
economic factors that may lead to a breakout of hostility,
1 the present paper highlights 
the role of an emotional factor, hatred, in shaping the course of conflicts between 
nations following a signing of an agreement for cessation of violence. As violent 
interaction between nations is likely to be propagated by their mutual levels of hatred, 
each nation’s hatred toward its rival is taken to be a destructive, collective mental 
state. This mental state is strengthened by the nation’s collective impression of the 
opponent’s violence, habitual (or inertial) propensity to hate and propensity to 
reciprocate aversion. This state is weakened by the nation’s fading memory of past 
hostility. The paper argues that cessation of violence is a necessary, but not sufficient, 
condition for reaching a stable, genuine peace between nations. In addition to formal 
agreements, genuine and stable peace requires the dissolution of the hatred between 
the nations. Inertia, persistent memories of hatred and high propensities to reciprocate 
aversion prevent nations from reaching a genuine and stable peace.  
                                                 
1 For example, Grafinkel (1994) studies the interactions between domestic politics and international 
conflicts and shows that political party competition associated with electoral uncertainty leads to a 
decline in military spending. She argues that democratic institutions can be thought of as a possible 
“pre-commitment” mechanism that reduces the severity of conflict between nations. Hess and 
Orphaniedes (2001), however, dispute the idea that democracy and democratic institutions reduce 
conflict and frequency of wars among nations. Bearce and Fisher (2002) argue that there is an inverse 
relationship between trade and war. Nafziger and Auvinen (2002) show how other socio-economic 
factors such as income inequality and pervasive rent-seeking by a ruling elite are linked to war and 
state violence. Hess and Orphanides (1995) stress the role of recessions as triggering external conflict. 
Blomberg and Hess (2002) argue that a recession combined with external conflict increases the 
probability of internal conflict. 
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In particular, the paper deals with the question whether following cessation of 
violence between antagonistic nations there will be a convergence to a stable, genuine 
peace. The evolution of mutual hatred between two nations is presented by a system 
of two motion equations. The inherent course of their conflict is diagnosed by 
identifying the asymptotic properties of the system’s steady state and summarised in 
two propositions. These propositions may be useful for shedding light on the 
prospects of genuinely peaceful resolution, after signing an agreement for truce, of 
conflicts in dual-population lands such as the Indian Sub-Continent, Sri-Lanka, Fiji, 
Sudan, Rwanda, South-Africa, North-Ireland, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cyprus, Lebanon 
and Israel-Palestine. The propositions are used for assessing the prospects  of a 
genuine and stable peaceful resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 formally presents the evolution of 
hatred between two nations and the conditions for diffusing hatred and reaching a 
stable, genuine peace. Section 3 argues that these conditions are not satisfied in the 
Israeli-Palestinian case. A strict separation, which is based on complete withdrawal of 
Israel from the Palestinian populated territories conquered in June 1967, can reduce 
the friction between the two nations but at the costs of forgone Israeli access to sacred 
sites and strategic areas. Section 4 analyses the prospects of complete Israeli 
withdrawal. Section 5 concludes. 
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2. A Formal Analysis of the Evolution of Hatred and the Conditions for Genuine 
and Stable Peace 
Consider a conflict between two nations—A and B. The evolution of the 
hatred level of A toward B (denoted by
A H  with negative values representing 
affection of A toward B) and the evolution of the hatred level of B toward A (denoted 
by
B H  with negative values representing affection of B toward A) are parsimoniously 
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where t is a continuous time index,
2  
A
t V  is the intensity of A’s violence against B at t, 
B
t V  is the intensity of B’s violence against A at  t,  1 b  and  2 b  are parameters 
reflecting the effects of each nation’s violence on the evolution of  its counterpart’s 
level of hatred, and  11 a ,  12 a ,  21 a , and  22 a  are the elements of the equation-system’s 
state-transition matrix.  
In this framework, the parameters  11 a  and  22 a  reflect the effects of the current 
hatred level of each nation on the evolution of its hatred toward the counterpart. The 
sign and size of each of these parameters depend on two opposite factors associated 
with the current level of this destructive mental state: the nation’s collective habitual 
propensity to hate its counterpart—inertia hereafter—and the nation’s instantaneous 
weakening of this state caused by fading collective memory of hatred toward the 
opponent. Therefore,  11 a  and  22 a  are, positive if the respective nation’s hatred-
                                                 
2 Alternatively, time can be taken to be discrete and the evolution of hatred can be depicted by a system 
of difference equations.   4
inertia dominates the nation’s diminishing memory of hatred toward its counterpart. 
They are zero, or even negative, otherwise.  
The parameter  12 a  indicates the effect of nation B’s level of hatred toward 
nation A on the evolution of nation A’s hatred toward nation B. Similarly,  21 a  
indicates the effect of nation A’s level of hatred toward nation B on the evolution of 
nation B’s hatred toward nation A. That is,  12 a  reflects the collective propensity of 
the people of nation A to reciprocate hatred toward nation B and  21 a  reflects the 
collective propensity of the people of nation B to reciprocate hatred toward nation A. 
Though not compatible with benevolent moral values, these propensities are assumed 
to be non-negative, which is most likely compatible with the common, natural 
inclination. 
 
DEFINITION: Genuine peace is a course of affair between nation A and nation 
B that is free of violence (
B A V V = = 0 ) and reflecting diminishing trend of mutual 
hatred from initial positive levels ( 0 , 0 0 >
B A H H ). 
 
Cessation of violence is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for genuine 
peace. That is, although the steady state (SS) of the differential equation-system (1) 
and (2) associated with 




ss H H = = 0 ), there is not 
necessarily a convergence to this steady state.
3  
The inherent course of the A -B conflict, subject to mutual refraining from 
violence, is identified by the characteristic roots of the state-transition matrix of the 
homogeneous part of the aforementioned linear differential equation system: 
                                                 




ss H H ) can be analytically displayed by 
adding scalars to the right-hand-sides of equation (1) and equation (2).   5
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When these characteristic roots are negative, or conjugate-complex pair with a 




ss H H = = 0 , is asymptotically 
stable—cessation of violence starts genuine peace between A and B. 
 
PROPOSITION 1:  When nation A and nation B mutually refrain from 
violence, genuine peace prevails if, and only if,  
i.  A and B have sufficiently weak inertia and strongly diminishing 
memories of hatred so that  0 , 22 11 < a a , and 
ii.  A’s and B’s propensities to reciprocate aversion ( 0 , 21 12 ‡ a a ) are 
sufficiently low so that  21 12 22 11 a a a a > . 
 
PROOF: Conditions i and ii ensure that the characteristic roots are either negative or 
constituting a conjugate-complex pair with a negative real part. In the first case, the 
hatred-free steady state is a proper node, whereas in the second case, it is approached 
by a spiral.  
Note that when the propensities to reciprocate aversion are such that 
22 11 21 12
2
22 11 22 11 ) ( 25 . 0 a a a a a a a a < < + - , there is convergence to a hatred-free 
steady state between nation A and nation B from any initial level of mutual hatred. If 
the propensities to reciprocate aversion are sufficiently  low, so that 
2
22 11 22 11 21 12 ) ( 25 . 0 a a a a a a + - <  (i.e., 0 < D ), the convergence to the hatred-free 
steady between A and B from any initial level of mutual hatred is along a spiral   6
displaying alternating periods of mutual hatred, one-sided hatred, and  mutual 
affection.  
 
PROPOSITION 2:  When nation A and nation B mutually refrain from 
violence, there exists a single trajectory of genuine peace along which their levels of 
hatred continually decrease if, and only if, one of the nations has a weak inertia and 
strongly diminishing memory of hatred so that, despite the inertia-dominated 
generation of hatred by the other nation,  0 22 11 < +a a . 
 
PROOF: When only one of the nations has a dominant, strongly diminishing 
collective memory (i.e., either  0 11 < a  and  0 22 > a , or vice versa), and recalling the 
assumption that  0 , 21 12 ‡ a a , then  0 21 12 22 11 < - a a a a  and consequently 
22 11 a a + > D . Given that  0 22 11 < +a a ,  0 1 > l  whereas  0 2 < l . In this case, the 





ss H H = = 0  from a positive mutual (not necessarily the initial) level of hatred.   
 
3. Implications for the Israeli -Palestinian Conflict 
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one of the longest and most contagious 
disputes in the recorded human history. Due to chronically weak Palestinian 
governance and a vicious circle of provocations and retaliations, it has been difficult 
for Israelis and Palestinians to cease violence. It is proposed in this section that even if 
this problem is overcome, genuine peace between Israel and Palestine will not prevail. 
The underlying rationale for this proposition is that  the conditions identified in 
Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 are not fulfilled.   7
 
CLAIM 1: The Israeli people and the Palestinian people have strong inertia 
and memory of their mutual hatred. 
 
Though this claim is not necessarily valid for every Israeli and Palestinian, it is a 
plausible qualitative assessment of the collective Israeli and the collective Palestinian 
inertia and memory for the following reasons. 
i. Long history of hostility: The hostility between the people of Israel and the people 
of Palestine prevailed during the Biblical (Judges and Kings) period and was resumed 
with the first wave of modern Jewish immigration in 1884. 
ii. Severe scarcity of natural resources: There has been a fierce competition on 
essential natural resources—arable land and fresh water in particular—between the 
people of Israel and the people of Palestine. 
iii. Israeli anxiety stemming from topographical sensitivity: The narrow coastal plain, 
which hosts the vast majority of the (Jewish) Israeli population, is topographically 
dominated by the densely Palestinian-populated mountain ranges of the West Bank. 
iv. Palestinian anxiety stemming from territorial discontinuity and Israeli anxiety 
stemming from territorial fragility: The Palestinian territories, West Bank and Gaza 
Strip, are physically separated by Israeli territories. The Israeli southern region 
(Negev) and northern region (Gallile) are linked by a narrow, hard to defend, coastal 
plain. Similarly, Jerusalem is linked to the Israeli coastal plain by a narrow corridor. 
v.  Israeli anxiety stemming from internal demographic composition: About twenty 
percent of the citizens of Israel are Palestinians, many of whom are concentrated in 
strategically sensitive districts of Israel and are perceived to have different national 
aspirations than their Jewish counterparts.   8
vi. Unsettled refugees’ problems: About fifty percent of the Palestinian population of 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip is 1948 Palestinian refugees, and their descendants, 
from villages and towns embedded in present-day Israel. Likewise, about fifty percent 
of the Israeli population is pre-1948, 1948, and post-1948, Jewish refugees, and their 
descendants, from Middle-Eastern and North-African countries. 
vii. Long Israeli occupation: The West Bank and Gaza Strip have been under Israeli 
occupation since June 1967. 
viii. Israel’s expansionary actions: Israel has annexed East Jerusalem, which is sacred 
for Palestinians and regarded by them as their capital. Israel has also founded a large 
number of settlements in strategic areas and in friction-wise sensitive places (Hebron, 
most notably) in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
ix. Israeli anxiety stemming from Palestinian expansionary aspirations and 
intensions: The West Bank and Gaza Strip are small, densely populated, disconnected 
and poor in natural resources. These conditions render a state in these areas per se 
unviable. These conditions perpetuate aspirations of expanded Palestinian control 
over Palestinian-populated Israeli districts and other pre-1948 Palestinian-dominated 
Israeli districts and of establishing territorial corridor between the separated parts.  
x. Israeli anxiety and Palestinian incitement stemming from external, regional 
demography: Israel and the Palestinian territories are surrounded by Arab and Muslim 
countries, many of which perceive the Jewish state as a foreign entity and a fortress of 
a recent Judeo-Christian-Western crusade and prefer a Palestinian guardianship of the 
holy sites.  
 
CLAIM 2: The Israeli people and the Palestinian people have high propensity 
to reciprocate aversion toward one another.    9
 
The large, multidimensional differences between the Israeli society and the 
Palestinian society lend support to this claim. The Israeli society is democratic, 
modern, technologically advanced, affluent, and predominantly Jewish, whereas the 
Palestinian society is non-democratic, traditional, relatively poor, and predominantly 
Muslim. These fundamental differences propagate the mistrust, fear, envy and 
intolerance, which are embedded in, and mutually reflected by, large segments of the 
Israeli and Palestinian societies.  
Since both Israelis and Palestinians have strong inertia and vivid memories of 
their collective hatred as well as high propensities to reciprocate aversion toward one 
another, it is unlikely that their conflict will be transformed into a genuine and stable 
peace after signing an agreement for cessation of violence. The popular and continued 
support on both sides of hard-line, militant approach suggests that this is also the 
common view among Israelis and Palestinians. The premature optimism during the 
1990s about the prospects of genuine peace between Israelis and Palestinians was, 
perhaps, a mere reflection of the interaction between the Israeli and Palestinian 
negotiating teams and their mediators following the disintegration of the Soviet Union 
(which earlier played a significant role in the region and militarily and politically 
supported some of the radical Arab countries), the demise of the Iraq’s expansionary 
attempts and regional aspirations (which had been widely supported by the 
Palestinians), the outcomes of the U.S. led military campaign in the Gulf, and the 
subsequent belief in a “New World Order”. Since 2000 this optimism has faded with 
the Palestinian rejection of the most generous offer ever made by an Israeli prime 
minister, with the Palestinian suicide bombings and Intifada, and with Israel’s 
retaliatory excursions and erosion of The Palestinian Authority. A wall is presently   10
being built by Israel. The construction of the wall in its one-sided chosen path is not 
perceived by Palestinians as a barrier between Israelis and Palestinians but an Israeli 
attempt to draw in concrete new borders, fence and segregate Palestinian 
neighbourhoods, limit their political interaction and render any centralized Palestinian 
governance impossible. The wall does not separate Israelis from Palestinians. It is a 
memorial for the collective hatred between the two peoples. It is also a cause for them 
for reciprocating hatred. From the Palestinian perspective, a meaningful separation is 
attainable through a complete Israeli withdrawal to the pre-June 1967 borders. 
 
4. The Prospects of Complete Israeli Withdrawal 
As a genuine and stable peace is not attainable, the costs of complete Israeli 
withdrawal to the pre-June 1967 borders are the strategic exposure of the densely 
populated Israeli narrow central coastal plain and the loss of Israelis’ access to sacred 
sites. A complete Israeli withdrawal will probably be support by the large minority 
group of Palestinian Israelis. The critical issue is, however, whether Jewish Israelis 
are inclined to give consent to a complete withdrawal in the absence of genuine and 
stable peace. The analysis of this issue involves ex-ante assessment of the unobserved 
levels of lifetime satisfaction of Jewish Israelis from living with and, alternatively, 
without East Jerusalem, The West Bank and Gaza Strip (Territories, hereafter).  
The Territories are predominantly, very densely, populated by Palestinians. 
Hosting major historical and religious Jewish sites (sacred sites, hereafter, mainly in 
East Jerusalem and the West bank), much of their value for Israelis is sentimental and 
spiritual. The Territories, the mountainous West Bank in particular, also have a 
strategic value. As there is not convergence toward a stable and genuine peace 
between Israel and Palestine, a complete withdrawal denies Israel access to the sacred   11
sites and strategic areas in the Territories. While a total withdrawal reduces the 
friction between Jewish Israelis and Palestinians and thereby increases the life-
expectancy and lifetime utility of some Jewish Israelis, the depression from losing 
access to the sacred sites and the anxiety from losing strategic areas might decrease 
the life-expectancy and lifetime utility of other Jewish Israelis—strongly sentimental, 
religious and risk averse ones, in particular. A qualitative, formal analysis of these 
aspects is as follows.  
Let  i T  be the remaining life-expectancy of an i-th Jewish Israeli endowed with 
access to the Territories and  i g  the rate of change of her remaining life-expectancy 
caused by a full withdrawal, which is positive (negative) when the reduced-friction 
effect dominates (is dominated by) the combined adverse effects (depression and 
anxiety) stemming from the loss of access to sacred sites and strategic areas, and zero 
otherwise. Suppose, for tractability, that the lifetime-utility (LTU) functions of Jewish 
Israelis are additively separable and that each Jewish Israeli has a time-invariant 
instantaneous utility: namely,  0 > =
w
i it u u   with access to the Territories and 
0 > =
wo
i it u u  without access to the Territories, for every instance t. Suppose also that 
each Jewish Israeli has a time-invariant rate of time preference ( 0 ‡ i r ), and that 
some Jewish Israelis, those residing in the Territories, face immediate pecuniary and 
non-pecuniary costs of relocation ( 0 ‡ i C , expressed in utile).  
 
PROPOSITION 3:  If the ratio of instantaneous utilities in the mutually 
exclusive states (with and without the Territories) satisfies   12
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> , a rational Jewish Israeli prefers complete withdrawal 
from the Territories to retained access. 
 
PROOF: A rational Jewish Israeli prefers total withdrawal from the Territories to 
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which, by integration and rearrangement of terms, is equivalently rendered as 
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i u u >  is not a necessary condition for a Jewish-
Israeli to prefer complete withdrawal from the Territories to retained access. The 
group preferring withdrawal to retained access also includes people for whom the 





i u u < ) so long that they are endowed with a sufficiently low rate of time 
preference and expect the rate of increase in their remaining life-expectancy to be 
significant ( 0 >> i g ) and compensating for the loss of instantaneous utilities and the 
costs of relocation. Israelis who prefer the retaining of access to the Territories are 
characterised by 
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<  due to a large decline in their 
instantaneous utility from losing access to sacred sites, large non-pecuniary (mental) 
costs of relocation, and, possibly, an adverse effect of the anxiety stemming from loss 
of strategic areas and the depression stemming from the loss of access to the sacred 
sites on their remaining life-expectancy.    13
About three quarters of the Jewish-Israeli population, predominantly secular, 
reside in the narrow Mediterranean coastal plan encompassing Greater Tel Aviv and 
Greater Haifa, which constitutes about fifteen percent of the area of the State of Israel 
and is topographically dominated by the neighbouring mountainous West Bank. 
Despite climatic and environmental advantages, only a small portion of the Jewish-
Israeli population resides in the hinterland—in and around Jerusalem and other major 
historical Jewish sites in the Negev and the Gallile. This revealed residential 
preference lends support to the following claim. 
 
CLAIM 3: A majority of the Jewish Israelis is homo-Mediterranean. 
 
Claim 3 implies, on the one hand, that it is possible that the decline in the 
instantaneous utility from losing access to the sacred Jewish sites in the Territories is 
small for the majority of Jewish Israelis. On the other hand, a complete withdrawal 
from the Territories renders the majority of Jewish Israelis topographically exposed 
and strategically vulnerable to Palestinians, in particular, and Arabs, in general, and 
hence significantly reduces their instantaneous utilities and life expectancies. In other 
words, claim 3 suggests that, in the absence of stable and genuine peace, the main 
factor for most Jewish Israelis in considering a withdrawal from the Territories is 
security rather than sacred sites. If the positive effect of the reduced Israeli-Palestinian 
friction on their life expectancy dominates the negative effect of losing strategic areas, 
if the added lifetime utility during the extended life period more than compensates for 
the aforementioned depreciation in the instantaneous utility, and if most Jewish 
Israelis are rational, then  there is a Jewish Israeli majority in favour of complete 
withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza Strip.         14
5. Conclusion 
The paper analysed the role of hatred in the course of a conflict between two 
nations. By analysing the dynamic properties of a hatred motion-equation-system it 
was demonstrated that when the nations mutually refrain from violence a genuine 
peace prevails if, and only if, both nations have sufficiently weak inertia, strongly 
diminishing memories and low propensities to reciprocate aversion. It is possible that 
the convergence to a hatred-free peace from any combination of initial levels of 
mutual hatred displays alternating periods of mutual hatred, one-sided hatred, and 
mutual affection. When one of the nations does not have weak inertia and strongly 
diminishing memory of hatred, there exists a single convergent arm to a hatred-free 
peace if the other nation’s does possess these virtues. 
The co-existence of the Israeli people and the Palestinian people in the south-
eastern corner of the Mediterranean basin has been hostile, frequently violent, and 
hindering global security. It was argued that both Israel and Palestine have strong 
inertia and vivid memories of their collective hatred as well as high propensities to 
reciprocate aversion toward one another. Therefore, it is unlikely that the course of 
their conflict, even under mutual refraining from violence, leads to a stable and 
genuine peace. A strict territorial separation, which is facilitated by a complete Israeli 
withdrawal, can reduce friction between Israelis and Palestinians but at the costs of 
strategically exposing the densely populated Israeli, narrow central coastal plain. 
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